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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
• * * • 
EHLERS & EHLERS ARCHITECTS, * BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
a Utah corporation, 
• 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
CARBON COUNTY, Appeal No. 900051-CA 
A public corporation, * 
Defendant-Respondent. * 
* • • • 
JURISDICTION 
The instant appeal was filed HI l In1 Utah Supreme Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. (UCA) §78-2-2(3) ( j) (1953 as amended) 
which transferred t:,i appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to UCA §78-2-2(4). The Utah Couit ol Appeals obtained 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to UCA §7 8-2a-3(2) (j) . 
This appeal i: i .nmaiy Judgment granted 
defendant/respondent Carbon County (Carbon) tvy Sfn/eiit h District 
Judge Boyd Bunnell. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Is Carbon estopped to deny a contract with 
plaintiff/appellant Ehlers & Ehlers (Ehlers)? 
2. Did the actions ol Carbon revi ve ti le previous contract 
between itself <::. Ehlers? 
r- " : - > .- ui Carbon result in a new and binding 
contract with Ehlers? 
4. Was summary judgment properly granted by Judge Bunnell? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
UCA §17-5-5 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure (URCP) 56. 
The text of these rules will be found in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Ehlers is a professional corporation with only one present 
shareholder, Jack Ehlers. Sometime during 1977 Ehlers was 
requested by Carbon to design a building to be known as the 
Carbon County Criminal Justice Center. This building was to have 
courtrooms, commission chambers, and a jail, among other things. 
A standard contract was prepared and signed on 1 February 1978, a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The parties had a 
previous relationship at that time, as Ehlers had remodelled a 
school for them. See p. 9, 11. 16-17 of the Ehlers deposition. 
It was understood by all that Ehlers would do preparatory 
work on the Justice Center, but that full and final progress on 
the Justice Center would have to await a favorable vote on a bond 
issue, which took place on 15 March 1981. The bond issue failed, 
and Ehlers accepted $56,000.00 as payment in full for what he had 
already done. Although the project was halted at that time, 
Ehlers was told that if the project would be revived later, he 
would get the contract. See deposition of Ehlers, p. 50, 11. 7-8 
and pp. 58-60. 
For four years nothing happened, and then Ehlers received a 
call from Carbon's agent Lee Semken. Semken was then chairman of 
the Carbon County Commission, and called Ehlers on 8 January 1985 
to tell him the project had been revived as the Tri-Court 
Complex, a building similar to the Justice Center. According to 
Ehlers: 
"It was a telephone call and, well, I hung up the 
phone, and the courthouse is a go is word for word, 
yes. Then he said he'd like to see me on Tuesday at 
8:00, and then he went on to discuss, and I didn't 
write this in, that it was a very important thing that 
we get it done immediately and asked me if I could 
handle a time schedule of around six weeks, and I said 
you bet, and he said get the wheels rolling so I did." 
Deposition, p. 61, 11. 17-23. 
In addition, Semken asked Ehlers to meet him in his office 
on 15 January 1985, see deposition p. 61, 1. 19. At this 
meeting, not only was Semken present, but Floyd Marx and Guido 
Rachiele as well, and they met in the commission chambers, see 
deposition p. 62, 11. 24-25. This meeting lasted for at least 
three hours, with Semken, who was the commission chairman, and 
Marx and Rachiele, who were the other two commissioners. During 
this meeting the project was discussed at some length. See 
deposition p. 63, 11. 11-17. 
Ehlers acted upon the direction of Semken and the rest of 
the commissioners, and he stated that he went to considerable 
expense to get ready for the project, including doubling the size 
of his office, hiring new personnel, contacting engineering firms 
and telling them to put aside other projects to help him, and in 
general went to a great deal of time and effort. See deposition 
p. 62, 11. 2-7. After approximately two months of hard work on 
the project Ehlers was fired by Commissioner Rachiele. See 
deposition p. 66, 11. 10-17. 
Ehlers asked Lee Semken why he had been terminated, and then 
presented Carbon with a bill for his efforts in the previous two 
months, which was not paid. He stated: 
Lee (Semken) said that Judge Bunnel (sic) had a 
favorite in Eric Sandstrom, he'd worked with him on a 
project before, and I can certainly understand that, we 
all have favorites. That's why attorneys are hired and 
architects are hired by different people, and he said 
that there were state funds involved, that he had 
talked to the state and they were supporting him and 
that they were going to use Eric Sandstrom. Lee said 
that he couldn't fight City Hall. I told him Guido 
(Rachiele) had fired me Thursday. I think that's 
probably the first Lee knew of that. I think he 
thought he was bringing the bad tiding, and I asked Lee 
to confirm this by a letter and I would bill for the 
close-out costs as per the contract. Now, I never got 
any more correspondence from them after sending that, 
or after that I received nothing so I sent that last 
letter. 
Deposition p. 70, 11. 3-18. 
This action was filed in 1986. Carbon brought a summary 
judgment motion, which was ruled upon by Judge Bunnell on 1 
November 1989, and judgment was actually entered on 15 November 
1989. Ehlers brought a Motion for Reconsideration on 13 November 
1989, which was denied on 15 November 1989. Notice of appeal was 
filed 30 November 1989. Copies of these various motions, 
judgments, rulings, and the Notice of Appeal are attached hereto 
in chronological order as Exhibits B through J. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I 
CARBON COUNTY IS ESTOPPED TO DENY A CONTRACT WITH EHLERS 
All of the classical indicia of detrimental reliance and 
estoppel are present in this case. Ehlers reasonably relied upon 
the assertions of the full county commission in a meeting in the 
commission chambers, and went to a great deal of effort to meet 
the hasty deadlines the commissioners set for him. After two 
months of work the commission simply fired him without warning. 
Although estoppel arguments are commonly not allowed against 
government entities, they are proper when the facts are definite 
and the injustice is great, as in this action. 
II 
THE ACTIONS OF CARBON COUNTY REVIVED THE PREVIOUS CONTRACT 
The original written contract between Carbon and Ehlers was 
suspended by mutual assent after the bond issue failed, but 
Ehlers was told that if the funding ever became available, he 
would get the job. Four years later Ehlers was told that the 
project had been revived by one member of the commission, and 
this offer was ratified by the full commission in a meeting in 
their chambers. Ehlers accepted this renewed offer for a 
unilateral contract by performing the duties needed to bring this 
project to fruition, and Carbon could not withdraw their offer 
with impunity after Ehlers had begun this process of acceptance. 
Ill 
THE ACTIONS OF CARBON COUNTY CREATED A NEW CONTRACT 
The Chairman of the Carbon County Commission made Ehlers an 
offer, Ehlers accepted with clear and definite performance, and 
all the elements of a contract were present. This represented a 
binding unilateral contract between the parties. 
IV 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED 
Summary judgment is never proper when their are material 
issues of fact that must be decided by the trier of fact. Three 
extremely important issues were raised by Ehlers, and they could 
not possibly have been properly dismissed by the court without a 
full trial on the merits. These issues were whether the old 
contract had been revived, whether a new contract had been 
performed, and whether the county was estopped to deny the 
contract. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
CARBON COUNTY IS ESTOPPED TO DENY A CONTRACT WITH EHLERS 
Carbon is estopped to deny the contract between itself and 
Ehlers. Estoppel is defined as: 
1) an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with 
the claim afterwards asserted; 2) action by the other 
party on the faith of such admission, statement, or 
act; and 3) injury to such party resulting from 
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate 
such admission, statement, or act. 
Celebrity Clubf Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 602 P.2d 
689, 694 (Utah 1979). 
Estoppel arguments are generally not recognized against the 
government on public policy grounds. The leading case on 
estoppel and government entities is Utah State University of 
Agriculture and Applied Science v. Sutro and Co., 646 P.2d 715 
(Utah 1982). The Sutro court gave a detailed analysis on 
estoppel in general and against the government, and held: 
A decision which recognized that there are sometimes 
circumstances where the interests of justice demand 
allowing the doctrine of estoppel to be asserted 
against the government was issued over 100 years ago by 
the United States Supreme court in Hackett v. City of 
Ottawa. There the city official had represented that 
bonds were issued for a lawful purpose and issued them 
under the city's seal, but it was later determined that 
their issuance had not been in accordance with lawful 
authority. It was held that because such obvious 
unfairness would otherwise result to purchasers of the 
bonds, the city was estopped from asserting that they 
had been unlawfully issued and were void. 
Another case which we regard as helpful and 
representing sound reasoning on this subject is that of 
United States v. Lazy FC Ranch. After reviewing the 
case law, the court stated that estoppel should be 
allowed as a defense against the government where to do 
otherwise would work a serious injustice, and the 
public interest would not be unduly damaged by the 
interposition of that defense. In its discussion, the 
court engaged in what has been referred to as a 
"balancing of equities" test and concluded that under 
the facts of that case a grave injustice would result 
if the government were not held responsible for the 
information it had given the Ranch and which the latter 
had relied on; and that under the circumstances there 
would be no serious adverse effect either on public 
policy or the interest of the government by permitting 
the Ranch partners to retain the funds they had 
received. 
In the later case of United States v. Wharton, the 
court reiterated the standard set forth in Lazy FC 
Ranch. The defendants asserted the government was 
estopped by the affirmative misconduct on the part of 
government officials who gave them incorrect 
information. The court noted the precaution that not 
every form of official misinformation would be 
sufficient to estop the government, but where advice 
given was so closely related to basic fairness and the 
decision-making process, the government should be 
estopped from disavowing the representation made 
because to do so would work a serious injustice on the 
defendant and the interest of the public would not be 
unduly threatened or damaged. 
Our own court has similarly long since taken its 
position in accord with the doctrine just discussed, of 
looking through the rigidity of a general rule to see 
and apply and exception where it is plain that the 
interest of justice so require. In the case of Wall v. 
Salt Lake City, the city by affirmative acts and 
representation had allowed the plaintiffs to take 
possession of property which was difficult for the city 
to utilize as a street. In reliance thereon, the 
plaintiffs had possessed and cared for the property 
for over 20 years. The court held that the city was 
estopped from repudiating its representations and 
reclaiming the property. The ruling in the Wall case 
was restated with approval in the later case of Tooele 
City v. Elkinqton, though the court was not persuaded 
that the factual requirements for invoking estoppel 
against the city were met. 
We have recently had occasion to confront another 
situation where egregious injury would result unless 
estoppel was applied against a governmental 
institution. In Celebrity Club v. Utah Liquor Control 
Commission, the plaintiff club had made large 
expenditures, relying on assurances of an official of 
the Liquor Commission, which this court held could not 
be repudiated to the injury of the club. 
We regard the authorities referred to above as 
well reasoned, with which our sense of justice is in 
harmony, and support of the well-recognized policy of 
the law as earlier set forth herein, to be the effect 
that the rule which precludes the assertion of estoppel 
against the government is sound and generally should be 
applied, except only in appropriate circumstances as 
hereinabove stated, where the interests of justice 
mandate an exception to that general rule. In cases 
where such an issue arises, the critical inquiry is 
whether it appears that the facts may be found with 
such certainty, and the injustice to be suffered is of 
sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception. And in 
case there is doubt on such matters, it should be 
resolved in favor of permitting the party to have a 
trial of the issue, as opposed to summary rejections 
thereof. 
Id. at 719-20. (emphasis added, citations omitted.) 
Plaintiff's case fits very nicely into the exceptions. 
First, the facts may be found with certainty, there are phone 
records, diary entries, etc., which document the actions of the 
principals involved. Second, plaintiff expended approximately 
$64,000.00 in various costs in reliance upon the assertions of 
defendant's agent, Semken. To lose $64,000.00 is a grave 
injustice indeed. 
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UCA §17-5-5 deals with actions by the various county 
commissions, defines what constitutes a quorum, and states in 
part: "Not less than two members shall constitute a quorum for 
the transaction of business, and no act of the board shall be 
valid or binding unless two members concur therein." Ehlers was 
by no means relying upon only the unsupported words of Semken 
alone. We find in Ehlers deposition, p. 61^11.1-22, that Semken 
called Ehlers on 8 January 1985, told him the project was "a go," 
and asked him if he could be ready in six weeks. Semken asked 
Ehlers to meet him in his office on 15 January 1985, see 
deposition p. 61,1. 19. At this meeting, not only was Semken 
present, but Floyd Marx and Guido Rachiele as well, and they met 
in the commission chambers, see deposition p. 62, 11. 24-25. 
This meeting lasted for at least three hours, with Semken, who 
was the commission chairman, and Marx and Rachiele, who were the 
other commissioners. During this meeting the project was 
discussed at some length. See deposition p. 63, 11. 11-17. 
Plaintiff had a long meeting with a quorum pursuant to the 
above statute, in the commission chambers. During this meeting 
pressure was put upon plaintiff to get the project done as 
quickly as possible, and plaintiff relied upon these assertions 
to his detriment. This is estoppel, plain and simple. If 
plaintiff may not reasonably rely upon the assertions of the 
entire commission speaking at a meeting in their official 
chambers, what may he rely upon? 
Furthermore, as noted with emphasis supra, in cases where 
estoppel is asserted against the government, the policy in Utah 
is to allow a full trial on the merits, rather than summary 
disposition. 
II 
THE ACTIONS OF CARBON COUNTY REVIVED THE PREVIOUS CONTRACT 
During the deposition of Mr. Ehlers, he was asked about the 
bond issue and the courthouse project, and specifically about the 
status of the project after the bond issue failed. He replied: 
At that time I was aware that it would not go at that 
time, but I was always told and aware that at some time 
it would move on; therefore, I would keep dropping in 
as I went to Moab or to Emery or whatever just to touch 
base with the commissioners. 
Deposition, p. 58 1. 24 through p. 59 1. 3. 
The meaning of this is plain, and that meaning is that the 
offer for the contract was still open, pending a solution to the 
funding problem. Williston On Contracts, Third Edition §45, 
deals with offers where something is reserved for future 
determination. It states: 
Although a promise may be sufficiently definite when it 
contains an option given to the promisor or promisee, 
yet if an essential element is reserved for the future 
agreement of both parties, the promise can give rise to 
no legal obligation until such future agreement. 
In this case the future agreement came to pass, and the original 
contract continued in a state of suspended animation until Semken 
uttered the magic words of offer, "the courthouse is a go." The 
details of this offer could be filled in and made more definite 
by referring to the original contract, see Williston §47. The 
two buildings were quite similar, the major difference between 
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the two being that the Tri-Court Complex would not have a jail or 
commission chambers. 
Thus the contract was a suspended but continuing one between 
Ehlers and Carbon. Carbon revived it with a new and definite 
offer, Ehlers accepted by deed and word, and Ehlers is entitled 
to his damages for Carbon's breach thereof. 
Ill 
THE ACTIONS OF CARBON COUNTY CONSTITUTED A NEW CONTRACT 
To revert for a moment to the first day of contracts class, 
offer plus acceptance equals contract. As noted supra in the 
statement of the case, Semken called Ehlers and said "the 
courthouse is a go." This offer was ratified by the entire 
commission by holding a meeting in their chambers with Ehlers. 
This was an offer for a unilateral contract, a promise for an 
act, that act being the design and construction of the Tri-Court 
Complex. Ehlers accepted by increasing his staff, holding 
meetings with the commission, etc. This part performance of a 
unilateral contract makes it binding. See 17 AmJur 2d Contracts 
§37. in addition the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
specifically addresses these issues. In S89B(2) we find the 
following: "An offer which the offeror should reasonably expect 
to induce action or forbearance of a substantial character on the 
part of the offeree before acceptance and which does induce such 
action or forbearance is binding as an option contract to the 
extent necessary to avoid injustice." 
The injustice of this situation is open and obvious. An 
architect is approached by the Chairman of the County Commission 
to design a building with great haste. The architect meets with 
the full commission in the commission chambers, and the project 
is discussed at great length. The architect hires staff, delays 
other projects, and in general makes very substantial commitments 
based on the assertions of the full commission and past 
experience. Then a powerful political figure decides he wants 
another man to design the building, and after two months of 
intense labor the architect is unceremoniously fired, and the 
county refuses to reimburse him for his considerable losses. The 
county then tries to hide behind governmental immunity, while the 
architect must bear devastating losses of $64,000.00. This is a 
textbook example of the damages that §89B(2) was designed to 
recompense. 
IV 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED 
URCP 56(c) states that judgment is proper "if the pleadings, 
depositions...(etc.) show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact..." The wording makes it plain that only one 
genuine issue need be raised by the opponent to deny summary 
judgment to the movant. Ehlers raised at least two, and a third 
one in the Motion for Reconsideration. The issues that needed to 
be addressed in this case were 1) whether the conduct of Carbon 
revived the contract, and 2) whether a new contract was formed 
between Ehlers and Carbon. These issues were raised in Ehlers 
"Response Memorandum To Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment," 
attached hereto as Exhibit D. The estoppel issue was thoroughly 
addressed in the Motion for Reconsideration, attached hereto as 
Exhibits G and H. These were issues of fact, to be decided by 
the trier of fact, and were not properly susceptible to summary 
disposition in this manner. 
It is the stated policy of this court to allow a full trial 
when issues of estoppel and governmental immunity are raised in 
an action. The issue was directly addressed in the Sutro case 
supra, which held: 
[T]he critical inquiry is whether it appears that the 
facts may be found with such certainty, and the 
injustice to be suffered is of sufficient gravity, to 
invoke the exception. And in case there is doubt on 
such matters, it should be resolved in favor of 
permitting the party to have a trial of the issue, as 
opposed to summary rejections thereof. Id. at 719-20. 
(citations omitted.) 
There can be no doubt whatsoever that there has been a grave 
injustice to Ehlers, and everyone in this position deserves a day 
in court. 
CONCLUSION 
Ehlers and Carbon had a contract to build a courthouse, and 
by mutual agreement that contract was put into suspended 
animation at the time the bond issue failed. However, it was 
agreed between the parties that if the funding became available 
in the future, the building would become a viable project again. 
The building was funded four years later, the full county 
commission ratified the offer of Semken, and Ehlers went to 
considerable expense to meet the accelerated timetable that the 
commission insisted upon. After two months of hard work, a 
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member of the commission discharged him because of political 
pressure, and now the county wishes to hide behind the doctrine 
of immunity, rather than face its obligation in an honorable 
manner. This is injustice of the most transparent sort, and the 
county is estopped to deny the contract that was formed. 
Summary judgment was not proper in this case. There were 
many issues that needed to be addressed, which were properly 
raised before the court. URCP 56 states that there need be only 
one genuine issue of material fact to resist summary judgment. 
Ehlers prays that this court reverse the summary judgment of 
Judge Bunnell, and remand this case for a full trial on the 
issues. As noted supra, the ruling of this court in the Sutro 
case cannot be overemphasized, and it stated: 
[T]he critical inquiry is whether it appears that the 
facts may be found with such certainty, and the 
injustice to be suffered is of sufficient gravity, to 
invoke the exception. And in case there is doubt on 
such matters, it should be resolved in favor of 
permitting the party to have a trial of the issue, as 
opposed to summary rejections thereof. 
Id. at 719-20. (citations omitted.) 
Equity and justice can settle for no less. 
DATED this - ^ day of March, 1990. 
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD, P.C. 
- / 
^V" Aly.l/ 
..-y-,,^  
L. .Charles Spafford 
Attorney for Ehlers 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that he mailed a copy of 
the above document to John Schindler, 120 E. Main, Pr^c^, UT 
84501 on the date above. ,• * ,, 
ADDENDA AND EXHIBITS 
THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS 
- S . M-* DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT 
Z. 
^ - ^ 
AM Document B131 
Standard Form of Agreement Between 
Owner and Architect 
on a basis of a 
PERCENTAGE OF CONSTRUCTION COST 
THIS DOCUMENT HAS IMPORTANT LEGAL CONSEQUENCES; CONSULTATION WITH 
AN ATTORNEY IS ENCOURAGED WITH RESPECT TO ITS COMPLETION OR MODIFICATION 
AGREEMENT 
made this First day of February in the year of Nineteen 
Hundred and Seventy-eight 
BETWEEN 
THE CARBON COUNTY COMMISSION FOR CARBON COUNTY the Owner, and 
EHLERS AND EHLERS ARCHITECTS, INCORPORATED the Architect-
It is the intention of the Owner to erect the Carbon County Criminal Justice Center 
hereinafter referred to as the Project. 
The Owner and the Architect agree as set forth below. 
AIA DOCUMENT B131 • OWNER-ARCHITECT AGREEMENT (PERCENTAGE) • APRIL 1970 EDITION • AIA* "" 
€ 1970 • THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, 1735 NEW YORK AVE., N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006 1 
I. THE ARCHITECT shall provide professional services for the Project in accordance with the Terms 
and Conditions of this Agreement 
per cent ( 
per cent ( 
per cent ( 
per cent ( 
6 %) 
8 %) 
8 %) 
10 %) 
I I . THE OWNER shall compensate the Architect, in accordance with the Terms and Conditions of 
this Agreement, as follows: 
a. FOR THE ARCHITECT'S BASIC SERVICES, as described in Paragraph 1.1, Basic Compensation 
computed at the following percentages of the Construction Cost, as defined in Article 3, for 
portions of the Project to be awarded under 
A Single Stipulated Sum Contract ( p r e f e r r e d ) 
Separate Stipulated Sum Contracts 
A Single Cost Plus Fee Contract 
Separate Cost Plus Fee Contracts 
AN INITIAL PAYMENT of F ive Hundred dollars ($ 5 0 0 . 0 0 ) 
shall be made upon the execution of this Agreement and credited to the Owner's account 
If the Building is to be a remodel and addition to an existing 
structure, it is agreed that the above percentages are to be 
increased by two (2%) percent* 
b. FOR THE ARCHITECT'S ADDITIONAL SERVICES, as described in Paragraph 1.3, compensation 
computed as follows: 
Principals' time at the fixed rate of T h i r t y - f i v e dollars ($ 3 5 . 0 0 ) 
per hour. For the purposes of this Agreement, the Principals are: 
A. Jack Ehlers 
Employees' time computed at a multiple of two and o n e - h a l f ( 2 - 1 / 2 ) 
times the employees' Direct Personnel Expense, as defined in Article 4. 
Additional services of professional consultants engaged for the norma! structural, mechanical 
and electrical engineering services at a multiple of One and One-hal f 
( 1 - 1 / 2 ) times the amount billed to the Architect for such additional services. 
Services of other professional consultants at a multiple of one and o n e - h a l f 
( 1 - 1 / 2 ) times the amount billed to the Architect for such services. 
The rates and multiples set forth In this Paragraph lib will be subject to renegotiation if the 
services covered by this Agreement have not been completed within t w e n t y - f o u r 
( 24 ) months of the date hereof. 
c FOR THE ARCHITECT'S REIMBURSABLE EXPENSES, amounts expended as defined in Article 5. 
d. THE TIMES AND FURTHER CONDITIONS OF PAYMENT shall be as described in Article 6. 
AIA DOCUMENT B131 • OWNER-ARCHITECT AGREEMENT (PERCENTAGE) • APRIL 1970 EDITION • AIA* 
© 1970 • THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE Of ARCHITECTS, 1735 NEW YORK AVE., N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C 20006 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN OWNER AND ARCHITECT 
ARTICLE 1 
ARCHITECT'S SERVICES 
1.1 BASIC SERVICES 
The Architect's Basic Services consist of the five 
phases described below and include normal struc-
tural, mechanical and electrical engineering services. 
SCHEMATIC DESIGN PHASE 
1.1.1 The Architect shall consult with the Owner to as-
certain the requirements of the Project and shall confirm 
such requirements to the Owner. 
1.1.2 The Architect shall prepare Schematic Design 
Studies consisting of drawings and other documents illus-
trating the scale and relationship of Project components 
for approval by the Owner, 
1.13 The Architect shall submit to the Owner a State-
ment of Probable Construction Cost based on current 
area, volume or other unit costs. 
DESIGN DEVELOPMENT PHASE 
1.1.4 The Architect shall prepare from the approved 
Schematic Design Studies, for approval by the Owner, the 
Design Development Documents consisting of drawings 
and other documents to fix and describe the size and 
character of the entire Project as to structural, mechani-
cal and electrical systems, materials and such other essen-
tials as may be appropriate. 
1.1.5 The Architect shall submit to the Owner a further 
Statement of Probable Construction Cost. 
CONSTRUCTION DOCUMENTS PHASE 
1.1.6 The Architect shall prepare from the approved De-
sign Development Documents, for approval by the Own-
er, Working Drawings and Specifications setting forth in 
detail the requirements for the construction of the entire 
Project including the necessary bidding information, and 
shall assist in the preparation of bidding forms, the Con-
ditions of the Contract, and the form of Agreement be-
tween the Owner and the Contractor. 
1.1.7 The Architect shall advise the Owner of any ad-
justments to previous Statements of Probable Construction 
Cost indicated by changes in requirements or general 
market conditions. 
1.1.8 The Architect shall assist the Owner in filing the 
required documents for the approval of governmental 
authorities having jurisdiction over the Project. 
•IDDING OR NEGOTIATION PHASE 
1.1.9 The Architect, following the Owner's approval of 
the Construction Documents and of the latest Statement 
of Probable Construction Cost, shall assist the Owner in 
obtaining bids or negotiated proposals, and in awarding 
and preparing construction contracts. 
CONSTRUCTION PHASE — ADMINISTRATION 
OF THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT 
1.1.10 The Construction Phase will commence with the 
award of the Construction Contract and will terminate 
when the final Certificate for Payment is issued to the 
Owner. 
1.1.11 The Architect shall provide Administration of the 
Construction Contract as set forth in Articles 1 through 14 
inclusive of the latest edition of AIA Document A201, Gen-
eral Conditions of the Contract for Construction, and the 
extent of his duties and responsibilities and the limitations 
of his authority as assigned thereunder shall not be modi-
fied without his written consent. 
1.1.12 The Architect as the representative of the Owner 
during the Construction Phase, shall advise and consult 
with the Owner and all of the Owner's instructions to the 
Contractor shall be issued through the Architect. The 
Architect shall have authority to act on behalf of the 
Owner to the extent provided in the General Conditions 
unless otherwise modified in writing. 
1.1.13 The Architect shall at all times have access to 
the Work wherever it is in preparation or progress. 
1.1.14 The Architect shall make periodic visits to the 
site to familiarize himself generally with the progress and 
quality of the Work and to determine in general if the 
Work is proceeding in accordance with the Contract Doc-
uments. On the basis of his on-site observations as an 
architect, he shall endeavor to guard the Owner against 
defects and deficiencies in the Work of the Contractor. 
The Architect shall not be required to make exhaustive 
or continuous on-site inspections to check the quality or 
quantity of the Work. The Architect shall not be respon-
sible for construction means, methods, techniques, se-
quences or procedures, or for safety precautions and 
programs in connection with the Work, and he shall not 
be responsible for the Contractor's failure to carry out the 
Work in accordance with the Contract Documents. 
1.1.15 Based on such observations at the site and on the 
Contractor's Applications for Payment, the Architect shall 
determine the amount owing to the Contractor and shall 
issue Certificates for Payment in such amounts. The is-
suance of a Certificate for Payment shall constitute a rep-
resentation by the Architect to the Owner, based on the 
Architect's observations at the site as provided in Sub-
paragraph 1.1.14 and on the data comprising the Appli-
cation for Payment, that the Work has progressed to the 
point indicated; that to the best of the Architect's knowl-
edge, information and belief, the quality of the Work is 
in accordance with the Contract Documents (subject to 
an evali/ation of the Work for conformance with the Con-
tract Documents upon Substantial Completion, to the re-
sults of any subsequent tests required by the Contract Doc-
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urnents, to minor deviations from the Contract Documents 
correctable prior to completion, and to any specific quali-
fications stated in the Certificate for Payment); and that 
the Contractor isentitled to payment in the amount cer-
tified. By issuing a Certificate for Payment, the Architect 
shall not be deemed to represent that he has made any 
examination to ascertain how and for what purpose the 
Contractor has used the moneys paid on account of the 
Contract Sum. 
1.1.16 The Architect shall be, in the first instance, the 
interpreter of the requirements of the Contract Docu-
ments and the impartial judge of the performance there-
under by both the Owner and Contractor. The Architect 
shall make decisions on all claims of the Owner or Con-
tractor relating to the execution and progress of the Work 
and on all other matters or questions related thereto. 
The Architect's decisions in matters relating to artistic 
effect shall be final if consistent with the intent of the 
Contract Documents. 
1.1.17 The Architect shall have authority to reject Work 
which does not conform to the Contract Documents. 
Whenever, in his reasonable opinion, he considers it neces-
sary or advisable to insure the proper implementation of 
the intent of the Contract Documents, he will have author-
ity to require special inspection or testing of any Work in 
accordance with the provisions of the Contract Docu-
ments whether or not such Work be then fabricated, in-
stalled or completed. 
1.1.18 The Architect shall review and approve shop 
drawings, samples, and other submissions of the Contrac-
tor only for conformance with the design concept of the 
Project and for compliance with the information given 
in the Contract Documents. 
1.1.19 The Architect shall prepare Change Orders. 
1.1.20 The Architect shall conduct inspections to de-
termine the Dates of Substantial Completion and final 
completion, shall receive and review written guarantees 
and related documents assembled by the Contractor, and 
shall issue a final Certificate for Payment 
1.1.21 The Architect shall not be responsible for the 
acts or omissions of the Contractor, or any Subcontractors, 
or any of the Contractor's or Subcontractors' agents or 
employees, or any other persons performing arty of the 
Work. 
1.2 PROJECT REPRESENTATION BEYOND BASIC SERVICES 
1.2.1 If more extensive representation at the site than 
is described under Subparagraphs 1.1.10 through 1.1.21 
inclusive is required, and if the Owner and Architect agree, 
the Architect shall provide one or more Full-Time Project 
Representatives to assist the Architect. 
1.2.2 Such Full-Time Project Representatives shall be 
selected, employed and directed by the Architect, and the 
Architect shall be compensated therefor as mutually 
agreed between the Owner and the Architect as set forth 
in an exhibit appended to this Agreement 
1.2.3 The duties, responsibilities and limitations of au-
thority of such Full-Time Project Representatives shall be 
set forth in an exhibit appended to this Agreement 
1.2.4 Through the on-site observations by Full-Time Proj-
ect Representatives of the Work in progress, the Architect 
shall endeavor to provide further protection for the 
Owner against defects in the Work, but the furnishing of 
such project representation shall not make the Architect 
responsible for construction means, methods, techniques, 
sequences or procedures, or for safety precautions and pro-
grams, or for the Contractor's failure to perform the Work 
in accordance with the Contract Documents. 
1.3 ADDITIONAL SERVICES 
If any of the following Additional Services are 
authorized by the Owner, they shall be paid for by 
the Owner as hereinbefore provided. 
13 .1 Providing special analyses of the Owner's needs, 
and programming the requirements of the Project 
13.2 Providing financial feasibility or other special 
studies. 
1 3 3 Providing planning surveys, site evaluations, or 
comparative studies of prospective sites. 
13.4 Providing design services relative to future facili-
ties, systems and equipment which are not intended to be 
constructed as part of the Project 
1 3 3 Providing services to investigate existing condi-
tions or facilities or to make measured drawings thereof, 
or to verify the accuracy of drawings or other informa-
tion furnished by the Owner. 
13.6 Preparing documents for alternate bids or out-of-
sequence services requested by the Owner. 
13 .7 Providing Detailed Estimates of Construction Cost 
or detailed quantity surveys or inventories of material, 
equipment and labor. 
13.8 Providing interior design and other services re-
quired for or in connection with the selection of furniture 
and furnishings. 
13.9 Providing services for planning tenant or rental 
spaces. 
1.3.10 Making major revisions in Drawings, Specifica-
tions or other documents when such revisions are incon-
sistent with written approvals or instructions previously 
given and are due to causes beyond the control of the 
Architect. 
1.3.11 Preparing supporting data and other services in 
connection with Change Orders if the change in the Basic 
Compensation resulting from the adjusted Contract Sum 
is not commensurate with the services required of the 
Architect 
13.12 Making investigations involving detailed ap-
praisals and valuations of existing facilities, and surveys 
or inventories required in connection with construction 
performed by the Owner. 
1.3.13 Providing consultation concerning replacement 
of any Work damaged by fire or other cause during con-
struction, and furnishing professional services of the type 
set forth in Paragraph 1.1 as may be required in connection 
with the replacement of such Work. 
1.3.14 Providing professional services made necessary 
by the default of the Contractor or by major defects in 
the Work of the Contractor in the performance of the 
Construction Contract. 
1.3.15 Preparing a set of reproducible record prints of 
drawings showing significant changes in the Work made 
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during the construction process, based on marked-up 
prints, drawings and other data furnished by the Contractor 
to the Architect. 
1.3*16 Providing extensive assistance in the utilization 
of any equipment or system such as initial $tart-up or test-
ing, adjusting and balancing, preparation of operating and 
maintenance manuals, training personnel for operation and 
maintenance, and consultation during operation. 
13.17 Providing Contract Administration and observa-
tion of construction after the Construction Contract Time 
has been exceeded or extended by more than 10 days 
through no fault of the Architect 
U . I 8 Providing services after issuance to the Owner of 
the final Certificate for Payment. 
U . 1 9 Preparing to serve or serving as an expert witness 
in connection with any public hearing, arbitration proceed-
ing or legal proceeding. 
13.20 Providing services of professional consultants for 
other than the normal structural, mechanical and electri-
cal engineering services for the Project. 
13.21 Providing any other services not otherwise in-
cluded in this Agreement or not customarily furnished in 
accordance with generally accepted architectural practice. 
ARTICLE 2 
THE OWNER'S RESPONSIBILITIES 
2.1 The Owner shall provide full information regarding 
his requirements for the Project 
2.2 The Owner shall designate, when necessary, a rep-
resentative authorized to act in his behalf with respect to 
the Project. The Owner or his representative shall exam-
ine documents submitted by the Architect and shall 
render decisions pertaining thereto promptly, to avoid 
unreasonable delay in the progress of the Architect's work. 
2 3 The Owner shall furnish a certified land survey of the 
site giving, as applicable, grades and lines of streets, alleys, 
pavements and adjoining property; rights-of-way, restric-
tions, easements, encroachments, zoning, deed restrictions, 
boundaries and contours of the site; locations, dimensions 
and complete data pertaining to existing buildings, other 
improvements and trees; and full information concerning 
available service and utility lines both public and private, 
above and below grade, including inverts and depths. 
2.4 The Owner shall furnish the services of a soils engi-
neer or other consultant when such services are deemed 
necessary by the Architect, including reports, test borings, 
test pits, soil bearing values, percolation tests, air and 
water pollution tests, ground corrosion and resistivity tests 
and other necessary operations for determining subsoil, 
air and water conditions, with appropriate professional 
interpretations thereof. 
2.5 The Owner shall furnish structural, mechanical, 
chemical and other laboratory tests, inspections and reports 
as required by law or the Contract Documents. 
2.6 The Owner shall furnish such legal, accounting, and 
insurance counselling services as may be necessary for the 
Project, and such auditing services as he may require to 
ascertain how or for what purposes the Contractor has 
used the moneys paid to him under the Construction 
Contract. 
2.7 The services, information, surveys and reports re-
quired by Paragraphs 2.3 through 2.6 inclusive shall be 
furnished at the Owner's expense, and the Architect shall 
be entitled to rely upon the accuracy and completeness 
thereof. 
2.8 If the Owner observes or otherwise becomes aware 
of any fault or defect in the Project or non-conformance 
with the Contract Documents, he shall give prompt writ-
ten notice thereof to the Architect. 
2.9 The Owner shall furnish information required of him 
as expeditiously as necessary for the orderly progress of 
the Work, 
ARTICLE 3 
CONSTRUCTION COST 
3.1 The Construction Cost to be used as the basis for 
determining the Architect's Basic Compensation shall be 
the total cost or estimated cost to the Owner of all Work 
designed or specified by the Architect, which shall be 
determined as follows, with precedence in the order 
listed: 
3.1.1 For completed construction, the total cost of all 
such Work; 
3.1.2 For Work not constructed, (1) the lowest bona fide 
bid received from a qualified bidder for any or all of such 
Work, or (2) if the Work is not bid, the bona fide nego-
tiated proposal submitted for any or all of such Work; or 
3.13 For Work for which no such bid or proposal is 
received, (1) the latest Detailed Estimate of Construction 
Cost if one is available, or (2) the latest Statement of 
Probable Construction Cost 
3.2 Construction Cost does not include the compensa-
tion of the Architect and consultants, the cost of the land, 
rights-of-way, or other costs which are the responsibility 
of the Owner as provided in Paragraphs 2.3 through 2.6 
inclusive. 
3 3 Labor furnished by the Owner for the Project shall 
be included in the Construction Cost at current market 
rates including a reasonable allowance ior overhead and 
profit. Materials and equipment furnished by the Owner 
shall be included at current market prices, except that 
used materials and equipment shall be included as if pur-
chased new for the Project. 
3.4 Statements of Probable Construction Cost and De-
tailed Cost Estimates prepared by the Architect represent 
his best judgment as a design professional familiar with 
the construction industry. It is recognized, however, that 
neither the Architect nor the Owner has any control over 
the cost of labor, materials or equipment, over the con-
tractors' methods of determining bid prices, or over com-
petitive bidding or market conditions. Accordingly, the 
Architect cannot and does not guarantee that bids will not 
vary from any Statement of Probable Construction Cost 
or other cost estimate prepared by him. 
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3.5 When a fixed limit of Construction Cost is estab-
lished as a condition of this Agreement, it shall include a 
bidding contingency of ten percent unless another amount 
is agreed upon in writing. When such a fixed limit is estab-
lished, the Architect shall be permitted to determine what 
materials, equipment, component systems and types of 
construction are to be included in the Contract Docu-
ments, and to make reasonable adjustments in the scope 
of the Project to bring it within the fixed limit. The Archi-
tect may also include in the Contract Documents alternate 
bids to adjust the Construction Cost to the fixed limit 
3.5.1 If the lowest bona fide bid or negotiated pro-
posal, the Detailed Cost Estimate or the Statement of 
Probable Construction Cost exceeds such fixed limit of 
Construction Cost (including the bidding contingency) 
established as a condition of this Agreement, the Owner 
shall (1) give written approval of an increase in such fixed 
limit, (2) authorize rebidding the Project within a reason-
able time, or (3) cooperate in revising the Project scope 
and quality as required to reduce the Probable Construc-
tion Cost. In the case of (3) the Architect, without addi-
tional charge, shall modify the Drawings and Specifications 
as necessary to bring the Construction Cost within the 
fixed limit. The providing of such service shall be the 
limit of the Architects responsibility in this regard, and 
having done so, the Architect shall be entitled to compen-
sation in accordance with this Agreement 
ARTICLE 4 
DIRECT PERSONNEL EXPENSE 
4.1 Direct Personnel Expense of employees engaged on 
the Project by the Architect includes architects, engineers, 
designers, job captains, draftsmen, specification writers 
and typists, in consultation, research and design, in pro-
ducing Drawings, Specifications and other documents per-
taining to the Project, and in services during construction 
at the site. 
4.2 Direct Personnel Expense includes cost of salaries 
and of mandatory and customary benefits such as statu-
tory employee benefits, insurance, sick leave, holidays 
and vacations, pensions and similar benefits. 
ARTICLE 5 
REIMBURSABLE EXPENSES 
5.1 Reimbursable Expenses are in addition to the Com-
pensation for Basic and Additional Services and include 
actual expenditures made by the Architect, his employees, 
or his professional consultants in the interest of the Proj-
ect for the expenses listed in the following Subparagraphs: 
5.1.1 Expense of transportation and living when travel-
ing in connection with the Project; long distance calls 
and telegrams; and fees paid for securing approval of 
authorities having jurisdiction over the Project 
5.1.2 Expense of reproductions, postage and handling 
of Drawings and Specifications excluding duplicate sets 
at the completion of each Phase for the Owner's review 
and approval. 
5.1.3 If authorized in advance by the Owner, expense 
of overtime work requiring higher than regular rates and 
expense of renderings or models for the Owner's use. 
5.1.4 Expense of computer time when used in connec-
tion with Additional Services. 
ARTICLE 6 
PAYMENTS TO THE ARCHITECT 
6.1 Payments on account of the Architect's Basic Serv-
ices shall be made as follows: 
6.1.1 An initial payment as set forth in Paragraph Ila 
(Page 2) is the minimum payment under this Agreement 
6.1.2 Subsequent payments for Basic Services shall be 
made monthly in proportion to services performed so 
that the compensation at the completion of each Phase 
shall equal the following percentages of the total Basic 
Compensation: 
Schematic Design Phase 15% 
Design Development Phase 35% 
Construction Documents Phase . . . . 75% 
Bidding or Negotiation Phase 80% 
Construction Phase 100% 
6.2 Payments for Additional Services of the Architect as 
defined in Paragraph 1.3, and for Reimbursable Expenses 
as defined in Article 5, shall be made monthly upon 
presentation of the Architect's statement of services ren-
dered. 
6.3 No deductions shall be made from the Architect's 
compensation on account of penalty, liquidated dam-
ages, or other sums withheld from payments to con-
tractors. 
6.4 If the Project is suspended for more than three 
months or abandoned in whole or in part, the Architect 
shall be paid his compensation for services performed 
prior to receipt of written notice from the Owner of such 
suspension or abandonment, together with Reimbursable 
Expenses then due and all terminal expenses resulting 
from such suspension or abandonment If the Project is 
resumed after being suspended for more than three 
months, the Architect's compensation shall be subject to 
renegotiation. 
6.5 Payments due the Architect under this Agreement 
shall bear interest at the legal rate commencing sixty 
days after the date of billing. 
ARTICLE 7 
ARCHITECT'S ACCOUNTING RECORDS 
Records of the Architect's Direct Personnel, Consultant 
and Reimbursable Expenses pertaining to the Project 
shall be kept on a generally recognized accounting basis 
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and shall be available to the Owner or his authorized 
representative at mutually convenient times. 
ARTICLE 8 
TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT 
This Agreement may be terminated by either party upon 
seven days' written notice should the other party fail 
substantially to perform in accordance with its terms 
through no fault of the other. In the event of termination 
due to the fault of others than the Architect, the Archi-
tect shall be paid his compensation for services per-
formed to termination date, including Reimbursable Ex-
penses then due and all terminal expenses. 
ARTICLE 9 
OWNERSHIP OF DOCUMENTS 
Drawings and Specifications as instruments of service 
are and shall remain the property of the Architect whether 
the Project for which they are made is executed or not. 
They are not to be used by the Owner on other projects 
or extensions to this Project except by agreement in writ-
ing and with appropriate compensation to the Architect. 
ARTICLE 10 
SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS 
The Owner and the Architect each binds himself, his 
partners, successors, assigns and legal representatives to 
the other party to this Agreement and to the partners, 
successors, assigns and legal representatives of such other 
party with respect to all covenants of this Agreement. 
Neither the Owner nor the Architect shall assign, sublet 
or transfer his interest in this Agreement without the 
written consent of the other. 
ARTICLE 11 
ARBITRATION 
11.1 All claims, disputes and other matters in question 
arising out of, or relating to, this Agreement or the 
breach thereof shall be decided by arbitration in accord-
ance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of 
the American Arbitration Association then obtaining un-
less the parties mutually agree otherwise. This agreement 
to arbitrate shall be specifically enforceable under the 
prevailing arbitration law. 
11.2 Notice of the demand for arbitration shall be filed 
in writing with the other party to this Agreement and 
with the American Arbitration Association. The demand 
shall be made within a reasonable time after the claim, 
dispute or other matter in question has arisen. In no 
event shall the demand for arbitration be made after the 
date when institution of legal or equitable proceedings 
based on such claim, dispute or other matter in question 
would be barred by thg applicable statute of limitations. 
1 1 3 The award rendered by the arbitrators shall be final, 
and judgment may be entered upon it in accordance with 
applicable law in any court having jurisdiction thereof. 
ARTICLE 12 
EXTENT OF AGREEMENT 
This Agreement represents the entire and integrated 
agreement between the Owner and the Architect and 
supersedes all prior negotiations, representations or 
agreements, either written or oral. This Agreement may 
be amended only by written instrument signed by both 
Owner and Architect. 
ARTICLE 13 
GOVERNING LAW 
Unless otherwise specified, this Agreement shall be gov-
erned by the law of the principal place of business of the 
Architect 
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This Agreement executed the day and year first written above. 
OWNER 
THE CARBON COUNTY COMMISSION 
FOR CARBON COUNTY 
February 15, 1978 
ARCHITECT 
EHLERS AND EHLERS ARCHITECTS, INCORPORATED 
£^^a*£fAdw *-/'78 
A. Jack Ehlers 
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JOHN E. SCHINDLER 
Chief Deputy County Attorney 
120 East Main 
Price, Utah 84501 
(801) 637-4700 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
EHLERS & EHLERS ARCHITECTS, 
I N C . , 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARBON COUNTY, A Public 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
NOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 15514 
COMES NOW the Defendant, pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and moves the Court for Summary Judgment herein. As grounds 
therefore Defendant states that there are no material issues of facts and 
defendant is entitled to Judgment as a matter of law. Said Motion is based on 
Affidavits of NORMAN PRICHARD and TIM SIMMONS attached hereto, and the 
Deposition of JACK EHLERS on file herein. A Memorandum in Support of this 
Motion is submitted herewith. 
DATED this // day of September, 1989. 
Mnf SrLM. 
JOHN/E. SCHINDLER 
Chief Deputy County Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, Motion for Summary Judgment, postage prepaid, on this '/ day of 
September, 1989, to: Earl S. Spafford and L. Charles Spafford, SPAFFORD St 
SPAFFORD, 311 South State Street, Suite 380, Salt Lake City, Utah, 34111. 
MADALENE C. WILLIAMS, Secretary 
JOHN E. SCHINDLER 
Chief Deputy County Attorney 
120 East Main 
Pr ice , Utah 84501 
(801) 637-4700 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
SrATE OF UTAH 
EHLER3 & EHLERS ARCHITECTS, 
INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ; 
CARBON COUNTY, A Public \ 
Corporation, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
i Civil No. 15614 
INTRODUCTION 
Late in 1977, the Carbon County Commission proposed the construction 
of the Criminal Jus t i ce Center. To tha t end, an a rch i t ec t , the P la in t i f f 
herein, was contacted to move the project to a bond issue and hopefully, to 
complete construction. 
EHLERS AND EHLERS ARCHITECTS, Incorporated, executed a contract dated 
February 1, 1978. The project proceeded through the i n i t i a l stages of design 
and design development. 
The P la in t i f f completed drawings necessary for the bond e lec t ion . 
These drawings were presented by l e t t e r of February 27- 1981, from P la in t i f f to 
the Carbon County Commission. The bond issue was presented to the voters of 
Caroon County. A canvas of tha t e lec t ion was made on June 15, 1981. The vote 
was 304 in favor and 1399 agains t . 
In February, 1985, a building board was formed to proceed with the Tri 
Court Complex to house the Carbon County f a c i l i t y for the D i s t r i c t , Juvenile 
and Circui t Courts. 
The P la in t i f f i n i t i a t e d th is action in October, 1986, a l leging a 
breach of contrac t . I t i s the P l a i n t i f f ' s posit ion tha t the Tri-Court Complex 
project i s a continuation of the Criminal Jus t ice Center project and that his 
contract of February 1, 1973, requires the Defendant to continue P l a i n t i f f 1 s 
services for the Tri-Court Complex project . As th i s was not done, P la in t i f f 
argues, Defendant has breached i t s February 1, 1978, contract and P la in t i f f i s 
en t i t l ed to damages. 
Defendant submits, by th i s Motion for Summary Judgmant, tha t the 
Criminal Jus t i ce Center project ceased wten t t e bond issue fa i led , tha t 
P la in t i f f was fully paid for his services concerning that project and the T r i -
Court Complex i s not a continuation of the Criminal Jus t i ce Center project . 
Defendant, therefore, i s en t i t l ed to a dismissal of P l a i n t i f f ' s Complaint. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
P la in t i f f and Defendant entered into a contract en t i t l ed Standard Form 
of Agreement Between Owner and Architect . Tha contract which P la in t i f f a s se r t s 
as i t s basis for i t s claim is dated February 1, 1973, and i s attached to the 
Deposition of MR. JACK EHLERS of EHLERS AMD EHLERS ARCHITECTS, Incorporated, as 
Deposition Exhibit 1. The contract designates the project as the Carbon County 
Criminal Jus t i ce Center. The Carbon County Criminal Jus t i ce Center was to 
include court f a c i l i t i e s , remodeling of the j a i l and commission chambers. 
(EHLERS1 Deposition, page 192.) 
The P la in t i f f provided services through the schematic design phase and 
the design development phase of the Carbon County Criminal Jus t i ce Center 
project . (See paragraphs 1.1.1 and 1.1.4 of Article 1 of the contract -
EHLERS1 Deposition, Exhibit 1.) 
The development drawings were presented to the Carbon County 
Commission by l e t t e r dated February 27, 1981, from P la in t i f f and Defendant. 
(EHLERS1 Deposition, Exhibit 8 ) . The Carbon County Criminal Jus t ice Center 
project went to e lec t ion on the bond issue question in 1981. The bond issue 
fai led (See Affidavit of NORMAN PRICHARD and attachments the re to . ) 
The project known as the Carbon County Criminal Jus t ice Center 
provided for court f a c i l i t i e s , a remodeling and expanison of the j a i l and 
commission chambers. (See PRICHARD Affidavit and EHLERS1 Deposition, page 
19-) 
Defendant's posit ion i s that upon the fa i lu re of the bond issue the 
Carbon County Criminal Jus t i ce Center project terminated. (PRICHARD 
Affidavit . ) P la in t i f f was paid $56,000 for his services to tha t point . 
(EHLERS1 Deposition, pages 72-73 and PRICHARD Affidavit . ) 
Pla in t i f f acknowledged that he was aware tha t the Carbon County 
Criminal Jus t i ce Center project would not go forward unless the bond issue in 
1981 passed. (EHLERS1 Deposition, page 58, l ine 22 to l ine 3, page 59; page 
79, l ine 21 to l ine 6, p3ge 80.) 
Notwithstanding, the fa i lu re of the bond issue for the Carbon County 
Criminal Jus t i ce Center project , i t i s the P l a i n t i f f ' s posi t ion tha t the T r i -
Court Complex i s a continuation of the project known as the Carbon County 
Criminal Jus t i ce Center. (EHLERS1 Deposition, page 76, l ine 11 to l ine 16.) 
The project to construct the Tri-Court Complex was begun in 1985. 
(PRICHARD Affidavit .) This project contained f a c i l i t i e s for the D i s t r i c t , 
Juvenile and Circui t Courts of what i s now know as the Seventh Judic ia l 
D i s t r i c t s i t t i n g in Pr ice , Carbon County, Utah. I t includes court rooms and 
support c l e r i ca l f a c i l i t i e s (SIMMONS Affidavit . ) The services of P la in t i f f 
were not u t i l i zed for the Tri-Court Complex project . 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant's argument can be succinctly s tated as follows: 
1. P l a i n t i f f ' s claim is based on his posit ion that the Tri-Court 
Complex project i s a continuation of the Carbon County Criminal Jus t ice Center 
project . (EHLERS1 Deposition, page 76, l ines 11-16.) 
2 . Tha Carbon County Criminal Jus t i ce Center project i s not the same 
as the Tri-Court Complex project . 
3 . Therefore, P l a i n t i f f ' s Complaint should be dismissed. 
The Carbon County Criminal Jus t i ce Center project was an ef for t to 
have an integrated un i t encompassing commission chambers, j a i l and d i s t r i c t 
court room f a c i l i t i e s as an extension to the exis t ing courthouse in Pr ice . The 
Tri-Court Complex houses only the three courts and the i r support c l e r i ca l 
s taff , including clerks off ices . Ttere are no j a i l f a c i l i t i e s nor was i t ever 
considered tha t the Carbon County Commission u t i l i z e the Tri-Court Complex 
f a c i l i t y . (SIMMONS Affidavit .) 
JACK EHLERS, the principal of EHLERS AND EHLERS ARCHITECTS, 
Incorporated, acknowledged his understanding tha t the Carbon County Criminal 
Jus t i ce Center project would not proceed unless the bond issue therefore was 
successful. MR. EHLERS t e s t i f i e d : 
"QUESTION: Were you aware a t that time that the project 
wouldn't go forward unless the bond issue passed? 
ANSWER: At that time I was aware tha t i t would not go a t 
tha t time, but I was always told and aware that a t some time 
i t would move on; therefore, I would keep dropping in as I 
went to Moab or to Emery or whatever j u s t to touch base with 
the commissioners." (EHLERS1 Deposition, page 58, l ine 22 
to page 59, l ine 3; 
nIHE WITNESS: I agreed, and i t ! s in your minutes and i t ' s 
in my l e t t e r , that i f the project was dead, instead of the 
amount due, $76,898.08, which was a l l due with the 
submission of these drawing, I would accept in ful l payment 
$56,000. Again, I was trying to save the county knowing of 
the i r funds condition. 
QUESTION: (By Mr. Schindler) If t t e project did not 
proceed? 
ANSWER: Had died, then I would have accepted ~ 
QUESTION: $56,000? 
ANSWER: $56,000. 
QUESTION: And l e t i t go? 
ANSWER: And l e t i t go." (EHLERS1 Deposition, page 79, l ine 
20 to page 80, line 6.) 
P la in t i f f acknowledges agreeing to payment of $56,000 for the services 
he performed on the two phases of t t e contract which were concluded. (EHLERS* 
Deposition, page 31, l ine 7; page 38, l ine 6 to page 39, l ine 1; page 79, l ine 
20 to page 80, l ine 6.) (See a lso PRICHARD Affidavit and minutes a t tached.) 
P la in t i f f knew his services would not be necessary if the bond issue fa i led . 
(EHLERS1 Deposition, page 58, l ine 22 to page 59, l ine 3; page 24, l ines 12-
23.) P la in t i f f , therefore, received compensation, a t an amount to which he 
agreed, for the services he rendered from February, 1978 to June, 1981, 
concerning the Carbon County Criminal Jus t ice Center project . 
P l a i n t i f f ' s claim i s based on his contention that t t e Carbon County 
Criminal Jus t ice Center and t t e Tri-Court Compolex projects are t t e same. 
(EHLERS1 Deposition, page 76, l ines 11-16.) Material submitted in support of 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment es tabl i shes these projects are two 
separate and d i s t i n c t pro jec ts . Defendant i s e n t i t l e d to Judgment on t t e 
undisputed facts as presented. 
CONCLUSION 
Tte two projects - the Carbon County Criminal Justice Center and the Tri-Court 
Complex - are not the same projects. This fact has been establisted by the 
Affidavits submitted in support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Defendant submits that Plaint i f f ' s Complaint, as a matter of law, should be 
dismissed. 
DATED this / / day of September, 1989. 
JOHN/B. SCHINDLER 
Chier Deputy County Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
postage prepaid, on this / / day of September, 1989, to: Earl S. Spafford and 
I . Charles Spafford, SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD, 311 South State Street, Suite 330, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111. 
t, 
MADALENE C. WILLIAMS, Secretary 
JOHN E. SCHINDLER 
Chief Deputy County Attorney 
120 East Main 
Price, Utah 84501 
(801) 637-4700 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
EHLERS & EHLER3 ARCHITECTS, 
INC., , 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
CARBON COUNTY, A Public ) 
Corporation, ] 
Defendant. ] 
I AFFIDAVIT OF TIM SIMMONS 
i Civil No. 15614 
STATS OF UTAH ) 
• ss 
COUNTY OF CARBON j 
CQM£3 NOW TIM SIMMONS and being duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and 
s t a t e s as follows: 
1. Affiant is the Court Administrator for the Seventh Judicial 
District Court in and for Carbon County, State of Utah. 
2. As Court Administrator Affiant is familiar with t te court faci l i ty 
which houses t te Seventh Distr ict , Juvenile and Circuit Courts in and for 
Carobn County, located in Price, Utah. Affiant was involved in t te above-
referenced project which came to be known as t te Tri-Court Complex project from 
i t s inception. 
3. The Tri-Court Complex facil i ty was never intended to, nor were 
plans discussed to, house faci l i t ies for the Carbon County Commission or the 
Carbon County j a i l . 
4. The Tri-Court Complex nev2V included plans to house faci l i t ies for 
t te Carbon County Commission. 
5. The Tri-Court Complex was never intended to be an extension of t te 
existing Carbon County Courthouse. Said faci l i ty was to be an independent 
faci l i ty to house t te three courts as hereinafter indicated. 
6. Tte present faci l i ty known as tte Tri-Court Complex includes 
three court rooms, one each for t te District Court, Juvenile Court and Circuit 
Court. In addition, said Complex includes judges chambers for each judge of 
the above-referenced courts, secretarial and clerical staff fac i l i t i es and 
offices for the clerks of each respective court. Also, with reference to the 
Juvenile Court t te Tri-Court Complex includes office space for the probation 
officers who function, as required by statute, in conjunction with said 
Juvenile Court. 
Furtter Affiant sayeth not. 
DATED this / ^ d a y of September, 1989. 
L<^l/l*^+C&7<*& 
tM SIMMONS 
Subscribed and sworn /TO before rre this ffi|fv day of September, 1989. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at -r\ ir : I JlAk 
My Commission Expires: fl\,x. J jQl 
JOHN E. SCHINDLER 
Chief Deputy County Attorney 
120 East Main 
Price, Utan 84501 
(801) 537-4700 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTS 
STATE OF UTAH 
EHLERS & EHLERS ARCHITECTS, ] 
I N C . , ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
CARBON COUNTY, A Public ) 
Corporation, ] 
Dsfendant. ] 
i AFFIDAVIT OF NORMAN PRICHARD 
• Civil No. 15514 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
I SS. 
COUNTY OF CARBON ) 
GOMES NOW NORMAL PRICHARD and being duly sworn upon his oath, deposes 
and states, as follows: 
1. Affiant is the Carbon County Clerk/Auditor. Affiant has held the 
office of the Carbon County Clerk/Auditor since October 1, 1977. 
2. That Affiant has reviewed the records of Carbon County, State of 
Utah, with reference to the attachments to this Affidavit, 
3. Affiant held the above-referenced office during the operative 
period of tin**, that period being February 1, 1978, through Jane, 1981. 
4. Affiant has attached hereto true and correct copies of the minutes 
of the Carbon County Commission concerning the Carbon County Criminal Justice 
Center with reference to Commission meetings on the following dates: 
a. November 14, 1977. 
b. May 3, 1978. 
c. November 1, 1978. 
d. October 22, 1980. 
e. December 15, 1980. 
f. April 8, 1981. 
g. June 15, 1981. 
5. Tte records of Carbon County indicate payment to EHLERS AMD EHLERS 
ARCHITECT, Inc., in the sum of $56,000.00. 
rte Carbon County Criminal Justice Center project included faci l i t ies 
for the District Court, commission chambers and an expanded and remodeled j a i l 
faci l i ty a l l to be a part of the existing Carbon County Courthouse. 
6. Tte Tri-Court Complex project began in 1983. Said project was 
Initiated to contain courtrooms and supporting clerical and clerk fac i l i t ies 
for t te District Court, Juvenile Court and Circuit Court s i t t ing in Price, 
Carbon County, State of Utah. Said project did not contain provision for any 
other faci l i ty and was intended solely to house t te three aforerrantioned 
courts. 
7. Affiant was present during several discussions involving JACK 
EKLERS, on behalf of EHLERS AND EHLERS ARCHITECTS, Inc., and tne Carbon County 
Commission. Tte County Commission indicated to MR. EHLERS, from tte cutset, 
that t te Carbon County Criminal Justice Center project could not procoad unless 
t te bond issue passed. 
8. Tte project was presented to t te public for a bond issue, Tte 
project was rejected by a vote of 304 in favor and 1399 against. Ttesa results 
were certified by t te commission on June 15, 1981. 
Further Affiant sayeth not. 
DATED this ^ day of September, 1989. 
n7h 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this j day of September, 1989. 
.1 ' 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at fad< /^/J^-
My Commission Expires': tf/.$/ J i/'O 
L. CHARLES SPAFFORD (4416) 
CHASE KIMBALL (4993) 
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD 
A Professional Corporation 
425 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-1234 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
I IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
1  STATE OF UTAH 
i * * * * 
!] EHLERS & EHLERS ARCHITECTS, * 
' a Utah corporation, 
l| * RESPONSE MEMORANDUM TO 
l| Plaintiff, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
j| * JUDGMENT 
I VS . 
I CARBON COUNTY, Civil No. 15614 |! A public corporation, * 
1
 Judge Boyd Bunnell 
!' Defendant. * 
i 
I' * * * * 
ji COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF, who hereby submits this Response 
j Memorandum to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
I 
j BACKGROUND FACTS 
Plaintiff does not presently dispute the Undisputed Facts 
section of defendant's brief, with some important exceptions. 
1. The unnumbered sixth paragraph under the UNDISPUTED 
FACTS section of defendant's brief states: "Plaintiff 
acknowledged that he was aware that the Carbon County Criminal 
Justice Center project would not go forward unless the bond issue 
In 1981 passed." However, in the deposition Mr. Ehlers goes on 
:o say: "I was aware that it would not go at that time, but I 
ras always told and aware that at some time it would move on: 
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therefore, I would keep dropping in...just to touch base with the 
commissioners." EHLERS' Deposition, page 58 line 24 through page 
59 line 3. 
2. The unnumbered seventh paragraph under the UNDISPUTED 
FACTS section states that it is plaintiff's position that the 
Tri-Court Complex is a continuation of the Carbon County Criminal 
Justice Center. That is true, but plaintiff is not claiming that 
the projects were identical, and presumably defendant is not 
prepared to argue that the two projects did not in fact have a 
great deal in common. 
3. The above quote from Ehlers' deposition, and other 
| statements from Mr. Semken found on page 61 of the deposition 
i 
| and quoted in detail below raise the issue of whether a contract 
; was revived or existed between the parties in the instant action. 
j ARGUMENT 
i DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT REVIVED THE CONTRACT 
As noted above, Ehlers was aware that his contract depended 
upon the bond issue that failed. However, he was led to believe 
that the contract would be revived if and when the project went 
forward, as discussed supra. Ehlers further discusses how Mr. 
Semken of the Carbon County Commission called him on 8 January 
1985 to tell him the project had been revived, and he states: 
"It was a telephone call and, well, I hung up the 
phone, and the courthouse is a go is word for word, 
yes. Then he said he'd like to see me on Tuesday at 
8:00, and then he went on to discuss, and I didn't 
write this in, that it was a very important thing that 
we get it done immediately and asked me if I could 
handle a time schedule of around six weeks, and I said 
you bet, and he said get the wheels rolling so I did." 
EHLERS' Deposition, page 61 lines 17 through 23. 
Ehlers acted upon the direction of Semken, and he states 
that he went to considerable expense to get ready for the 
project, including doubling the size of his office, hiring new 
personnel, contacting engineering firms and telling them to put 
aside other projects to help him, and in general went to a great 
deal of time and effort. See EHLERS7 Deposition page 6 2 lines 2 
through 7. At the very least, plaintiff is entitled to reliance 
damages, and this is a material issue that precludes summary 
disposition. 
A NEW CONTRACT WAS FORMED BETWEEN 
PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT 
As noted above, plaintiff was under the impression from the 
county commissioners that if the project was revived he would be 
given the contract. Not only was the behavior of Semken enough 
to revive the contract, but it had all the indicia of an 
independent contract as well. 
Semken called plaintiff and told him the courthouse project 
was "a go", that he wanted to meet with him, that it had to be 
done in six weeks, etc. These statements are obviously an Offer 
to contract from Semken. Ehlers verbally accepted this offer, 
and in addition detrimentally relied upon the offer. Not only 
are the classic elements of a contract present, but Semken, and 
(through his authority and agency as a county commissioner), the 
defendant as well are estopped to deny the contract pursuant to 
the most basic legal principles. The actions of Ehlers after the 
offer, and the prior written documents are enough to satisfy any 
3 
statute of frauds difficulties. 
This is another important legal issue that must be decided 
at trialf and may not be summarily dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, plaintiff prays that the summary judgment motion 
of defendant be dismissed, as the above argument makes it very 
plain that there are genuine issues of material fact that remain 
in the instant action, and therefore summary judgment pursuant to 
URCP 56 is inappropriate at this time. Plaintiff further prays 
for its costs and legal fees in having to respond to the motion 
of defendant. 
DATED this day of October, 1989. 
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD, P.C. 
ChasfeT Kimball ~ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that he mailed a true copy 
of the above document to John Schindler, 80 W. Main #201, Price, 
UT 84501, on the date above. 
£ ^-Z , 
A 
JOHN E. SCHINDLER 
Chief Deputy County Attorney 
120 East Main 
Price , Utah 84501 
(801) 637-4700 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
EHLERS & EHLER3 ARCHITECTS, ] 
INC., ; 
Pla in t i f f , ] 
vs . ) 
CARBON COUNTY, A Public ] 
Corporation, ] 
Defendant. ] 
> DEFEND/INT'S REPLY MEMORANDUM 
) REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
I FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I Civil No. 15614 
INTRODUCTION 
p l a i n t i f f has submitted a Response Memorandum concerning defendant's 
Motion for Saunary Judgment. Defendant submits th i s Memorandum to Reply to t t e 
argument advanced by P la in t i f f . 
P la in t i f f does not take issue with t t e Undisputed Facts as presented 
by Defendant in i t s Memorandum in Support. P la in t i f f , however, supplements 
t tese fac t s . P la in t i f f s t a t e s he " is not claiming that t te projects were 
iden t ica l" . ( P l a i n t i f f s Memorandum, paragraph 2, page 2 ) . P l a in t i f f also 
argues t te Defendant i s en t i t l ed to damages e i the r under a t teory of 
detrimental re l iance or t t e defendant i s estopped to deny t t e existence of a 
new contract . 
ARGUMENT - POINT I 
Defendant will examine P l a i n t i f f ' s arguments beginning with t t e 
estoppel argument. Tte case of Utah State University of Agriculture and 
Applied Science v. Sutro and Co., 646 P2d 715 (Utah 1932) s t a t e s t te general 
rule concerning estoppel agains t a governmental e n t i t y . Tte Court s tated t t e 
general rule tha t an estoppel argurrvent i s not available against a governmental 
e n t i t y . 
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There are times, however, when estoppel is available• These 
exceptions are discussed by Justice Crockett, writing on behalf of the Court, 
at page 719 of the Opinion, tfe need not address these exceptions because 
Plaintiff, by his own testimony acknowledged the need to obtain a firm f!go 
ahead" commitment from the Defendant when the Tri-Court Complex project began, 
A review of the Pla int i f f ' s testimony from page 61 to 67 reveals that 
Plaintiff cannot meet the elements of estoppel. In particular, Plaint i f f ' s 
statement on page 63 reveals precisely what Plaintiff was thinking after f i r s t 
hearing that the Tri-Court Complex was to begin. Plaintiff testified, " . . .of 
course, we were waiting for the final go ahead to s t a r t drawing." (EHLER31 
Deposition, page 63, line 16-17). 
This testimony indicates Plaintiff was aware he would need formal 
approval and instruction to proceed from the Carbon County Commission. 
To assert estoppel one must show a material misstatement of fact upon 
which the party asserting the estoppel has relied. Coleman v. Coleman, 743 
P2d 782 (Ut App. 1937) The Plaintiff ha3 shown neither. In fact, the 
Plaint i f f ' s testimony, as quoted above, indicates Plaintiff did not rely on 
statements purportedly made by LEE SEMKEN, Carbon County Commission 
Chairman. 
Further, estoppel is based on an objective test - what would a 
reasonable person conclude under the circumstances. Larson v. Wycoff, 624 
P2d 1151 (Utah 1981). Is i t reasonable for Mr. EHLER3 to rely on one telephone 
call from the chairman of a county commission to incur costs of 64,000 plus 
dollars on a project which will cost many thousands of dollars? Defendant 
submits not. 
Therefore, the estoppel argument advanced by Plaintiff is not viable. 
POINT II 
Plaintiff argues he relied on the statement by Commissioner SEMKEN, 
incurred costs therefrom and is, therefore, entitled to reliance damages. 
This argument also lacks merit. 
Defendant will accept as true the testimony of Plaintiff concerning these 
purported statements of LEE SEMKEN. Defendant does not intend to imply, nor 
does Defendant concede that these statements were made by Commission SEMKEN. 
In fact, Defendant believes Commissioner SEMKEN!s testimony at trial will be 
the ooDosite. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 17-5-5, 1987, in par t , s t a t e s , "Not less 
than two members (of the County Commission) shal l cons t i tu te a quorum for the 
t ransact ion of business, and no ac t of the board shal l be valid or binding 
unless two members concur there in ." 
Tte P la in t i f f had a history of extensive involvement with governmental 
e n t i t e s . (See Ehlers ' Deposition, page 9, l ines 15-25). 
P l a in t i f f was aware he would need Commission approval to proceed with 
t t e pro jec t . That i s why Mr. EHLERS, without s o l i c i t a t i o n and not in response 
to a d i r ec t question, s ta ted , a t page 63 of his Deposition, " . . . o f course, we 
were waiting for the f inal go ahead to s t a r t drawing." 
Pursuant to Utah Coda Annotated, Section 17-5-5, 1937, two members of 
the Commission must concur to cons t i tu te a valid and binding ac t of t t e 
Commission. P la in t i f f does not submit to t t e Court any fact supporting his 
argument of detrimental re l iance . Tte P la in t i f f has not because te cannot. 
Tte P la in t i f f Knew he mast obtain " t t e f inal go a t e i i " . As th i s approval was 
riBvev given, P l a i n t i f f ' s argument of detrimental rel iance must f a i l . 
POINT I I I 
Before concluding this Reply we must discuss P l a i n t i f f ' s statement in 
paragraph 2 of page 2 of his Response. 
Defendant submitted t t e Affidavits of NOMAN PRICHARD and TIM SIMMONS 
in support of i t s Motion for Summary Judgment. P la in t i f f has submitted no 
Affidavits or other material to supplement his Deposition testimony. Tte 
Affidavits of Mr. PRICHARD and Mr. SIMMONS, as well as t t e testimony of 
Mr. EHLERS in his Deposition, substant ia te t t e fact that t t e Carbon County 
Criminal Jus t ice Center and t t e Tri-Court Complex are separate and d i s t i n c t 
pro jec ts . 
Contrary to t te P l a i n t i f f f s asser t ion in paragraph 2 of page 2 of his 
Response, t t e Defendant does argue that these two projects did not have a great 
deal in common. Tte Carbon County Criminal Jus t ice Center project included 
f a c i l i t i e s for the D i s t r i c t Court, Commission Chambers and j a i l . (See PRICHARD 
Affidavit, paragraph 5 and EHLERS Deposition, page 19, l ines 13-19). Tte T r i -
Court Complex project was spec i f ica l ly for t t e three courts of what i s now t t e 
Seventh Judic ia l Court. Tte difference i s extensive. Tte Carbon County 
Criminal Jus t i ce Center project considered only one court room wtereas t t e T r i -
Court Complex project involved three court rooms. Tte Carbon County Criminal 
Justice Center project did not consider support staff for the three courts as 
did the Tri-Court Complex project. The Carbon County Criminal Justice Center 
project made provision for cormission chambers and j a i l - these fac i l i t ies 
were never a part of the Tri-Court Complex. The Tri-Court Complex was intended 
as an independent faci l i ty not as a reoodel and add-on as was the plan for the 
Carbon County Criminal Justice Center project. 
Therefore, the project which involved the Plaintiff (the Carbon County 
Criminal Justice Center project) was not revived; nor was i t resurrected with 
minor changes as argued by the Plaintiff. 
If the Pla int i f f ' s position herein were accurate Carbon County would 
be required to hire the Plaintiff when the Commission Chamber was redone as a 
Commission Chamber was part of his project; Carbon County would be required to 
hire the Plaintiff if a j a i l were constructed as this was part of his project. 
Plaintiff made no claim against Carbon County when the old District Court room 
was redone for a new Commission Chamber. 
Defendant submits the Plaint i f f ' s position is incongruous and lac*s 
legal basis. Defendant testified, as previously indicated, he considered the 
project concluded upon payment of the $56,000 and the failure of the bond 
issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. The 
Plaintiff knew the extent of his involvement concerning the Carbon County 
Criminal Justice Center project. The Plaintiff testif ied, f,I was paid the 
$56,000 up to the time of putting the job out for bond issue, and had the 
project stopped then we were square." (EHLERS* Deposition, page 34, line 20-
22). Again, Plaintiff testified, 
"ANSWER: I agreed to take $56,000. I'm always a softie. 
QUESTION: With the understanding that if the project 
proceeded then you would be paid more and in accordance with 
the contract? 
ANSWER: That is correct. And I stopped by here from tire 
to time when I was on the way to other work to see how i t 
was going, see if anything had happened. I stayed in 
touch." (EHLERS* Deposition, page 39, line 1-7). 
The undisputed facts are that the Plaintiff was paid for the services 
he performed for the Defendant concerning the Carbon County Criminal Justice 
Center project; that the Carbon County Criminal Justice Center project 
terminated whan the bond issue failed; and that the Tri-Court Complex project 
was not a continuation of the Carbon County Criminal Justice Center project. 
Based on these undisputed facts the Defendant is entit led to Judgment. 
DATED this ^ 7 day of Ls'cj 1939. 
JOriOf 5 / SCHINDLER 
Chief 'Deputy County Attorney 
CSRHFICAT5 OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I nailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Defendant's Reply Memorandum Regarding Defendant's Motion for "ji'sazj 
Judgment, postage prepaid, on this ' \ day of / ( ^ / / t V ; , 1939, to: Chase 
Kimball, SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD, 425 East 100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 34111. 
MADALENE C. WILLIAMS, Secretary 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
EHLERS & EHLERS ARCHITECTS, 
INC. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 1 
CARBON COUNTY, a Public 
corporation, ) 
Defendant. ] 
) RULING ON 
1 FOR SUMMARY 
1 Civil No. 
MOTION 
JUDGMENT 
15614 
The defendant has moved the Court for summary 
judgment and has submitted their Memorandum of Legal Points and 
Authorities together with Affidavits. The plaintiff has filed 
its objection to the granting of the Motion, The Court hereby 
orders that the Deposition of Jack Ehlers be published for the 
purpose of this ruling, and the Court has considered the 
matters contained in that Deposition. 
In its Memorandum, the plaintiff accepts the 
undisputed facts as stated by the defendant in their Memorandum 
except for two unimportant aspects. Based upon those accepted 
undisputed facts, and the Affidavit submitted, and the matters 
contained in the Deposition of Mr. Ehler, the Court finds that 
the Contract entered into by the plaintiff and the defendant on 
February 1, 1978 covering the Carbon County Criminal Justice 
Center was completely performed by the parties and was 
terminated. 
The Court further finds that the Tri-Court Complex 
project begun in 1985 was a different and distinct project and 
had no relationship to the 1978 Agreement entered into between 
the parties. 
The Court further finds that there exists no 
enforceable agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant, 
Carbon County Commission, that authorized the plaintiff to 
proceed with any work relative to the Tri-Court Complex 
project, and that, therefore, the plaintiff has no cause of 
action against the defendant. 
The Court grants the Motion for Summary Judgment for 
and on behalf of the defendant and directs that the defendant 
prepare a formal judgment in accordance with this ruling. 
The defendant is further awarded its costs in this proceeding. 
DATED this / j? day of November, 1989. 
(2) 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of 
the foregoing RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by 
depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, 
to the following: 
Earl S. Spafford 
L. Charles Spafford 
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD 
Attorneys at Law 
311 South State Street, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
John E. Schindler 
Chief Deputy County Attorney 
Carbon County Courthouse 
Price, UT 84603 
DATED this /^y^~ day of November, 1989 
Secretary 
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L. CHARLES SPAFFORD (4416) 
CHASE KIMBALL (4993) 
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD 
A Professional Corporation 
425 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
I STATE OF UTAH 
\ * * * * 
|EHLERS & EHLERS ARCHITECTS, * MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
ja Utah corporation, 
| Plaintiff, 
I * 
I vs • 
I * 
jCARBON COUNTY, Civil No. 15614 
IA public corporation, * | Judge Boyd Bunnell 
j Defendant. * 
i 
| * * * • 
COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF, and hereby requests the Court to 
reconsider or alter its summary judgment against plaintiff, 
pursuant to URCP 59(e). Plaintiff requests this reconsideration 
because a study of the cases relied upon by defendant suggests 
they actually support plaintiff's position as well if not more 
than that of defendant. 
A memorandum in support of this motion is attached hereto. 
DATED this , S day of November, 1989. 
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD, P.C. 
Chase KimbalT 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
[L. CHARLES SPAFFORD (4416) 
CHASE KIMBALL (4993) 
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD 
A Professional Corporation 
425 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 36 3-1234 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
EHLERS & EHLERS ARCHITECTS, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
CARBON COUNTY, 
A public corporation, 
Defendant. 
* MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Civil No. 15614 
Judge Boyd Bunnell 
COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF, and hereby respectfully submits 
this Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Reconsideration. 
BACKGROUND 
Defendant brought a motion for summary judgment on this 
matter, which was ruled on 1 November 1989. This court held that 
the original contract for the Carbon County Criminal Justice 
Center was discharged by the performance of the parties, a 
holding that is not disputed by either side. However, plaintiff 
takes exception to the holding of the court that there was no 
relationship between said Justice Center and the Tri-Court 
Complex, and further takes exception to the holding that there 
was no enforceable agreement between the parties. Finally, 
plaintiff notes that the judgment did not directly address the 
issue of reliance damages on the part of plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT IS ESTOPPED TO DENY AN AGREEMENT EXISTED 
The defendant is estopped to deny the contract between 
itself and plaintiff, in spite of the assertions to the contrary 
by defendant. In its reply memorandum, defendant relies very 
heavily on the case of Utah State University of Agriculture and 
Applied Science v. Sutro and Co., 646 P.2d 715 (Utah 1982) to 
support his assertions that an estoppel argument is not available 
against defendant because it is a government entity. While 
defendant does note that there are exceptions to this general 
rule, it claims that it need not address these exceptions. 
Plaintiff strongly disagrees with defendant's assertions re 
the estoppel exceptions. In support of this, plaintiff notes 
that the Sutro court held: 
A decision which recognized that there are 
sometimes circumstances where the interests of justice 
demand allowing the doctrine of estoppel to be asserted 
against the government was issued over 100 years ago by 
the United States Supreme court in Hackett v. City of 
Ottawa. There the city official had represented that 
bonds were issued for a lawful purpose and issued them 
under the city's seal, but it was later determined that 
their issuance had not been in accordance with lawful 
authority. It was held that because such obvious 
unfairness would otherwise result to purchasers of the 
bonds, the city was estopped from asserting that they 
had been unlawfully issued and were void. 
Another case which we regard as helpful and 
representing sound reasoning on this subject is that of 
United States v. Lazy FC Ranch. After reviewing the 
case law, the court stated that estoppel should be 
allowed as a defense against the government where to do 
otherwise would work a serious injustice, and the 
public interest would not be unduly damaged by the 
n 
interposition of that defense. In its discussion, the 
court engaged in what has been referred to as a 
"balancing of equities" test and concluded that under 
the facts of that case a grave injustice would result 
if the government were not held responsible for the 
information it had given the Ranch and which the latter 
had relied on; and that under the circumstances there 
would be no serious adverse effect either on public 
policy or the interest of the government by permitting 
the Ranch partners to retain the funds they had 
received. 
In the later case of United States v. Wharton, the 
court reiterated the standard set forth in Lazy FC 
Ranch. The defendants asserted the government was 
estopped by the affirmative misconduct on the part of 
government officials who gave them incorrect 
information. The court noted the precaution that not 
every form of official misinformation would be 
sufficient to estop the government, but where advice 
given was so closely related to basic fairness and the 
decision-making process, the government should be 
estopped from disavowing the representation made 
because to do so would work a serious injustice on the 
defendant and the interest of the public would not be 
unduly threatened or damaged. 
Our own court has similarly long since taken its 
position in accord with the doctrine just discussed, of 
looking through the rigidity of a general rule to see 
and apply and exception where it is plain that the 
interest of justice so require. In the case of Wall v. 
Salt Lake City, the city by affirmative acts and 
representation had allowed the plaintiffs to take 
possession of property which was difficult for the city 
to utilize as a street. In reliance thereon, the 
plaintiffs had possessed and cared for the property 
for over 20 years. The court held that the city was 
estopped from repudiating its representations and 
reclaiming the property. The ruling in the Wall case 
was restated with approval in the later case of Tooele 
City v. Elkincrton, though the court was not persuaded 
that the factual requirements for invoking estoppel 
against the city were met. 
We have recently had occasion to confront another 
situation where egregious injury would result unless 
estoppel was applied against a governmental 
institution. In Celebrity Club v. Utah Liquor Control 
Commission, the plaintiff club had made large 
expenditures, relying on assurances of an official of 
the Liquor Commission, which this court held could not 
be repudiated to the injury of the club. 
We regard the authorities referred to above as 
well reasoned, with which our sense of justice is in 
3 
harmony, and support of the well-recognized policy of 
the law as earlier set forth herein, to be the effect 
that the rule which precludes the assertion of estoppel 
against the government is sound and generally should be 
applied, except only in appropriate circumstances as 
hereinabove stated, where the interests of justice 
mandate an exception to that general rule. In cases 
where such an issue arises, the critical inquiry is 
whether it appears that the facts may be found with 
such certainty, and the injustice to be suffered is of 
sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception. And in 
case there is doubt on such matters, it should be 
resolved in favor of permitting the party to have a 
trial of the issue, as opposed to summary rejections 
thereof. Id. at 719-20. (emphasis added, citations 
omitted.) 
Upon review of this case, it is little wonder that defendant did 
not wish to delve into the exceptions provided by the court. 
Plaintiff's case fits very nicely into the exceptions. 
I 
j] First, the facts may be found with certainty, there are phone 
i 
|i records, diary entries, etc., which document the actions of the 
i! 
• I principals involved. Second, plaintiff laid out approximately 
r 
ii 
$64,000.00 in various costs in reliance upon the assertions of 
defendant's agent, Semken. Damages of $64,000.00 are substantial 
by almost anybody's standards. 
Defendant also relies heavily on UCA §17-5-5 to counter 
plaintiff's estoppel argument, stating that Semken as an 
individual did not have the power to bind the county. There are 
two counter arguments to defendant's assertions. First, in the 
Celebrity Club case discussed supra, the plaintiff relied upon 
the assertions of only one official of the Utah Liquor 
Commission, and said commission was estopped by the court. 
Secondly, and far more important, plaintiff was by no means 
relying upon only the unsupported words of Semken alone. We find 
in Ehlers deposition, p. 61 line 1 through 22, that Semken called 
Ehlers on 8 January 1985, told him the project was "a go," and 
asked him if he could be ready in six weeks. Obviously, on a 
project of this size, six weeks is a very short time and 
I plaintiff would have had to react immediately. In addition, 
j Semken asked Ehlers to meet him in his office on 15 January 1985, 
J see deposition page 61 line 19. At this meeting, not only was 
ij 
11Semken present, but Floyd Marx and Guido Rachiele as well, and 
ij 
'they met in the commission chambers, see deposition p. 62 lines 
'I 
t || 24-25. This meeting lasted for at least three hours, with 
!l Semken, who was the commission chairman, and Rachiele, who was 
•j 
I also a commissioner. During this meeting the project was 
,i discussed at some length. See deposition p. 63 lines 11-17. The 
j fact that at least two commissioners were present at this meeting 
ii 
[takes this issue complete beyond the strictures of UCA §17-5-5 as 
they relate to a quorum. 
Plaintiff had a long meeting with at least two 
commissioners, constituting a quorum pursuant to the above 
statute, in the commission chambers. During this meeting 
pressure was put upon plaintiff to get the project done as 
quickly as possible, and plaintiff relied upon these assertions 
to his detriment. This is estoppel, plain and simple. If 
plaintiff may not rely upon the assertions of two commissioners 
speaking at a meeting in their official chambers, what may he 
reasonably rely upon? If he feels that the urgency of the 
5 
situation prevents him from getting all the details worked out 
and signed on paper, does that prevent him from realizing his 
reliance damages? He may have wanted to wait for final go ahead 
in order to start drawing, but presumably that was because he was 
wary of any last minute changes from the board. However, 
concerns about minor last minute changes in the design would not 
prevent a reasonably prudent individual from doing preliminary 
work as Ehlers describes, that of hiring new staff, radically 
changing his schedule, and other necessary actions. 
Furthermore, as noted with emphasis supra, in cases where 
estoppel is asserted against the government, the policy in Utah 
is to allow a full trial on the merits, rather than summary 
!disposition. 
J The plaintiff has shown a material misstatement of fact. As 
[discussed supra, he had a phone call and held a long meeting with 
a quorum of the county commission, during which the project was 
planned and he was told he would be the architect. Then he was 
fired by Rachiele. This is incontestably a material 
misstatement, and therefore defendant's objections based on the 
case of Coleman v. Coleman, 743 P.2d 782 (Utah App. 1987) are 
met. 
Defendant also states that plaintiff has failed to meet the 
objective test, the reasonable man standard imposed by Larson v. 
Wycoff, 624 P.2d 1151 (Utah 1981). As note above, if a man can't 
rely upon a meeting held in the commission chambers with a quorum 
of the commission, what can he reasonably rely on? Defendant's 
6 
assertion that plaintiff relied upon only one phone call is 
demonstrably wrong. 
Defendant spends a considerable amount of time in his reply 
brief trying to prove the dissimilarity between the Tri-Court 
Complex and the Justice Center. Plaintiff agrees that the 
projects are not identical, but they don't need to be identical 
in order to show detrimental reliance upon the part of plaintiff. 
Even if the Justice Center had never been planned by defendant 
and designed by plaintiff, the actions of defendant in reference 
to the Tri-Court Complex merit reliance damages for plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff designed the Justice Center for defendant many 
years ago. When the bond issue failed and the Justice Center 
needed to be scrapped, plaintiff was requested to keep in touch 
and promised a shot at designing the successor project. In 1985 
plaintiff was approached by the defendant's commission and 
requested to begin work immediately on a similar project, to be 
completed in the shortest possible time. Plaintiff met with a 
quorum of the commission in the commission chambers and was told 
the prepare for the project. Plaintiff reasonably relied upon 
these orders. In order to react quickly enough to satisfy 
defendant, plaintiff made numerous expensive changes to his 
office and schedule, all to his detriment. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that this court reconsider its 
entry of judgment, and reopen this case that it might be tried on 
the merits in accordance with the directives of the Utah Supreme 
7 
Court. 7 
DATED this / N. day of November, 1989 
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD, P.C. 
Chase Kimball^ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that he mailed a true copy 
of the above document to John Schindler, 80 W. Main #201, Price, 
UT 84501, on the date above. 
/ / / 
8 
JOHN E. SCHINDLER 
Chief Deputy County Attorney 
120 East Main 
Price, Utah 84501 
(801) o37-4700 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUi.Tf 
STATE OF UTAH 
EHLERS & EHLERS ARCHITECTS, 
INC., ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
V5 • , 
CARBON COUNTY, A Public ] 
Corporation, ] 
Defendant. ) 
l J U D G M E N T 
• Civil No. 15614 
This natter having come before the Court on Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and the Court having reviewed said Motion, t te Memorandum 
submitted by both parties, the Affidavits in support of said Motion, the 
Deposition of JACK EHLERS and t te f i le herein, and further having submitted i t s 
Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment now finds as follows: 
1. That there are no material issues of fact and t te Defendant is 
enti t led to Judgment as a matter of law. 
2. That t te contract between t te parties dated February 1, 1973, was 
completely performed and terminated. 
3. That t te Tri-Court Complex, which began in 1935, was a different 
and dist inct project which had no relation to t te 1978 contract and t te subject 
thereof. 
4. As no agreement existed between t te Parties authorizing t te 
Plaintiff to proceed with any work relative to t te Tri-Court Complex, t te 
Plaintiff has no cause of action against t te Defendant. 
5. That t te Defendant is entitled to Judgment dismissing Pla int i f f ' s 
Complaint. 
6. That tte Defendant is entitled to Judgment against t te Plaintiff 
for i t s costs. 
7. That Defendant has submitted a Memorandum of Costs indicating 
costs in t te amount of $333.49. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND DECREED as fo l l ows : 
1. That P l a i n t i f f ' s Complaint be and i t i s hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
2 . That Defendant be awarded i t s costs in the amount of $333.49. 
DATED th i s , / ^ d a y of November, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
;~H33YD BUNNELL/ D i s t r i c t 'Judge 
C 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I nailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Judgment, postage prepaid, on this ,'5 day of November, 1939, to: 
Cr&se Kimball, SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD, 425 East 100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
84111. 
MADALENE C. WILLIAMS, Secretary 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
EHLERS & EHLERS ARCHITECTS, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARBON COUNTY, a Public 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
INC., ) RULING ON MOTION 
i TO RECONSIDER 
i Civil No. 15614 
The plaintiff has filed a motion to reconsider or 
alter the summary judgment of the Court, and states that the 
motion is being made pursuant to Rule 59(e). The Court hereby 
denies the motion on several grounds. First of all, no summary 
judgment has been issued. The Court rendered its Memorandum 
Decision, but has not formally entered a summary judgment and 
there was none on file at the time of the filing of plaintiff's 
motion. 
The reliance on Rule 59(e) is misplaced since that 
Rule only applies to judgments entered, and further, no grounds 
have been specified other than to reargue matters already 
considered. 
Lastly, there is nothing in the plaintiff's 
memorandum that would cause the Court to alter its opinion. 
Since the plaintiff has filed no objection to the 
Proposed Summary Judgment, as submitted by the defendant, the 
Court has, on this day, signed the Summary Judgment as proposed 
by the defendant. 
DATED this /S> ^ day of November, 1989. 
page two 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of 
the foregoing RULING ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER by depositing 
the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Earl S. Spafford 
L. Charles Spafford 
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD 
Attorneys at Law 
311 South State Street, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
John E. Schindler 
Attorney at Law 
First Interstate Bank Bldg. 
80 West Main, Suite 201 
Price, UT 84501 
DA TED t h i s /Sltf^ d aY of November, 1989. 
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L. CHARLES SPAFFORD (4416) 
CHASE KIMBALL (4993) 
l SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD |A Professional Corporation 
• 425 East 100 South 
;Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-1234 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
EHLERS & EHLERS ARCHITECTS, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARBON COUNTY, 
A public corporation, 
Defendant. 
* NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 15614 
Judge Boyd Bunnell 
COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF, and hereby gives all parties notice 
of its intent to appeal the ruling of the above-court granting 
summary judgment to plaintiff, as well as the denial of its 
Motion for Reconsideration of the summary judgment. This appeal 
is pursuant to URCP 73 and RUSC 3 and 4. This appeal is within 
the jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to UCA §78-2-
2(3) (j), and shall therefore be the court appealed to. 
DATED this Q Q day of November, 1989. 
Spafford & Spafford, P.C. 
549 COUNTIES 17-5-9 
bertion 
17-5-76 
17-5-77. 
17-5-78. 
17-579. 
17-5-80. 
17-5-80.5 
17-5-81. 
17-5-82. 
17-5-83. 
17-5-84 
17-5-85. 
17-5-80 
17-5 87. 
17-5-8^ 
Water survey — Co-operation with Utah 
Water Leers ' Association, or subsid-
iary organization 
Ordinances — Power to enact — Penalty 
for violation 
Establishing pure beet seed districts — 
Regulation — Penalties for violation. 
Study and improvement of county gov-
ernment — Board of county commis-
sioners — Charges and expenses. 
County resources — Power of board to 
provide for development. 
Historic and cultural resource programs. 
County resource development committee 
— Appointment of members — Terms, 
compensation and expenses, \acancies 
and removal of members. 
County resource development committee 
— Election of officers — Employment 
of executive director. 
County resource development committee 
— Functions of committee. 
County resources — Power of board to 
contract with other authorities 
County resources — Expenditure of 
county funds authorized 
Rewards for information — Law enforce-
ment — Protection of count\ property. 
County may adopt Utah Procurement 
Code. 
Contracting for management, mainte-
nance, operation, or construction of 
jail^. 
17-5-1. C o u n t y c o m m i s s i o n e r s — N u m b e r . 
Each county sh<Jl have a board of count\ commis-
sioners cwisi-'.ing of three member^ 19">< 
17-5-2. KlUibi l i ty — H o w ole< ted. 
Each ii" : .. - : of ihe board ui coun+v commissioner* 
shall h" an e'*- :*o»r ol the count v v. Inch he represents 
n m l TH1 must h, been such f . r a t leas - >ear imme-
diately preceding his election, and he shell he elected 
h\ th.'» qualified electors of the county at large. 19V? 
17-5-3. T e r m of office. 
County C"mrn!.—iuiK?s shall be elected in each 
county at the general election next preceding t\iij ex-
piration of th»" tern> of office of incumbents; one for a 
term of four \»-at» arid on*- for a term of tv,o years, 
and each shall hold office for the term for which 
eh fed arid until his sutcv-sor is elected and has 
qualified They shall take off'o* on the first Monday 
in Ja i .ua i \ next fallowing tru-ir election. iy">3 
17-5-4. V a c a n c i e s , h o w filled. 
When a vacancy occurs in the board of county com-
missiorier» through ineligibility, iesignation or death 
of an incumbent or of an ofiicer-oh-ct before quahfy-
mg, or refusal to act, or fr»i any other reason, the 
vacancy shall be filled as follows: 
U ) If two yeais remain on the unexpired terms 
as nf the- first Monday in January next and 30 
day.s. or more remain before the general election 
or if such office shall be vacant by the first Mon-
day of J a n u a r y next due to a certified written 
resignation submitted when 30 days or more re-
main before th»* general election, then the va-
cancy for the unexpired term shall be filled under 
the provisions of Sections 20-4-9 and 20-4-11.5, 
except that the vacancy shall be filled in the in-
terim period by appointment according to the 
provisions in (2) below. 
(2) If such vacancy occurs when fewer than 30 
days remain befoie the general election, then the 
vacancy shall be filled by the board by appoint-
ment from a list of at least six persons who have 
been endorsed in writing by the county central 
committee of the party to which the person be-
longed who occasioned the vacancy. Should the 
board fail to make the appointment within 30 
days after the vacancy occurs, the clerk shall no-
tify the governor of the fact, and the governor 
shall within 30 days after receipt of a notice fill 
the vacancy by appointment from the aforemen-
tioned list. If at any time there shall not be a 
majority of the board remaining in office, the 
governor shall appoint one or two commissioners, 
as the case may be, from the list or lists, until 
there shall be a majority, and the majority shall 
select the third commissioner as herein provided 
Appointees shall hold office for the unexpired 
term for which appointed or until a successor is 
elected and has qualified. J979 
17-5-5. C h a i r m a n — Q u o r u m — May admin i s t e r 
oa ths . 
County commissioners shall elect one of their num-
ber chairman. The chairman shall preside at all 
meetings of the board, and in case of his absence or 
inability to act the members present must, by an or-
der entered in their minutes, select one of their num-
ber to act as chairman temporarily. Any member of 
the board may administer oatfTs to any person when 
necessary in the performance of his official duties. 
Not less than two members shall constitute a quorum 
for the transaction of business, and no act of the 
board shall be valid or binding unless two members 
concur therein 1933 
17-5-6. Meetings — At coun ty seat . 
Tie- board of county commissioners must provide by 
oreiiii.-nee for the holdu.g of regular meeting-- of th«-
huiiid at the eount\ .seat IHVJ 
17-5-7. Special meet ings — H o w called — Busi-
ness limited. 
If at any time the business of the county requires a 
special meeting of the hoaid, such meeting may be 
ordered by a majority of the board or by the chairman 
thereof The order must be signed by the members or 
chairman calling such meeting and must be entered 
in the minutes of the board Five days' notice of such 
meeting must be given by the clerk to the members 
not joining in the order. The order must specify the 
business to be transact' d at such meeting, and none 
other than that specified shall be transacted at such 
special meeting unless all the members are present 
and consent thereto 195^  
17-5-8. Meet ings to be pub l i c — Books and 
r eco rds . 
All meetings of the board must be public, and the 
books, records and accounts must be kept at the office 
of the clerk, open at all times during usual business 
hours for public inspection. 1H53 
17-5-9. Rules and r egu la t i ons gove rn ing b o a r d 
and t r ansac t ion of bus iness . 
The board of county commissioners* shall have 
power to make and enfoice such rules and regulations 
for the government of the board, the preservation of 
order and the transaction of business as may be nec-
essary. 1953 
RULE 56 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
No judgment by default shall be entered against 
the State of Utah or against an officer or agency 
thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or 
right to relief by c\ idence satisfactory to the court. 
RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(a) Tor Claimant. 
(b) For Defending Parly. 
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. 
(d> Ciue Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. 
(e) Forn of Affiduwls; Further 7eMimon>; Defense 
Kttjufrcd. 
(f) When Affidavits are Unavailable. 
(£) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith. 
(a) For Claimant. 
A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counte-
rclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory 
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 
twenty da>s from the commencement of the action 
or after service of a motion for summary judgment 
by the adverse party, move with or without suppo-
rting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor 
upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For Defending Fart). 
A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is 
sought, may, at any time, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. 
The motion shall be served at least ten days 
before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse 
party prior to the day of hearing may serve oppo-
sing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rend-
ered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as^a matter 
of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability 
alone although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. 
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. 
If on motion under this Rule judgment is not 
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief 
asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the 
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings 
and the evidence before it and by interrogating 
counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material 
facts exist without substantial controversy and what 
material facts are actually and in good faith contr-
overted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying 
the facts that appear without substantial controv-
ersy, including the extent to which the amount of 
damages or other relief is not in controversy, and 
directing such further proceedings in the action as 
are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so 
specified shall be deemed established, and the trial 
shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense 
Required. 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made 
on personal knowledge; shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify 
to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in 
an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served the-
rewith. The court may permit affidavits to be sup-
plemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a 
motion for summary judgment is made and suppo-
rted as provided in this Rule, <m adverse party may 
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as oth-
erwise provided in thib Rule, must set forth spevsfic 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When Affidavits are Unavailable. 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons 
stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify 
his opposition, the court may refuse the application 
for judgment or may order a continuance to permit 
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken 
or discovery to be had or may make such other 
order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith. 
Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at 
any time that any of the affidavits presented purs-
uant to this Rule are presented in bad faith or solely 
for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith 
order the party employing thern to pay to the other 
party the amount of the reasonable expenses which 
the filing of the affidavits earned him to incur, 
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offe-
nding party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of 
contempt. 
RULE 57. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judg-
ment pursuant to chapter 33 of Title 78, U.C.A. 
1953, shall be in accordance with these Rules, and 
the right to trial by jury may be demanded under 
the circumstances and in the manner provided in 
Rules 38 and 39. The existence of another adequate 
remedy does not preclude a judgment for declara-
tory relief in cases where it is appropriate. The court 
may order a speedy hearing of an action for a dec-
laratory judgment and may advance it on the cale-
ndar. 
RULE 58A. ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
(a) Judgment Upon the Verdict of a Jury. 
(b) Judgment in Other Cases. 
(c) When Judgment Entered; Notation in Register of 
Actions and Judgment Docket. 
(d) Notice of Signing or Entry of Judgment. 
(e) Judgment After Death of a Party. 
(0 Judgment by Confession. 
(a) Judgment Upon the Verdict of a Jury. 
Unless the court otherwise directs and subject to 
the provisions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the 
verdict of a jury shall be forthwith signed by the 
clerk and filed. If there is a special verdict or a 
general verdict accompanied by answers to interro-
gatories returned by a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the 
court shall direct the appropriate judgment which 
shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. 
(b) Judgment in Other Cases. 
Except as provided in subdivision (a) hereof and 
subdivision (b) (1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall be 
signed by the judge and filed with the clerk. 
(c) When Judgment Entered; Notation in Register of 
Actions and Judgment Docket. 
A judgment is complete and shall be deemed 
entered for all purposes, except the creation of a 
lien on real property, when the same is signed and 
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